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Marxism, and the subject of the Tories 
led inexorably to conscription. 
To look at the Tories m e a n t 
examining how a party self-destructed 
over conscription, over the legacy of the 
Great War, and over the insistence of 
former Prime Minister, Senator and 
once and future wartime party leader 
Arthur Meighen on repeating past 
history. To Meighen and those who thought like 
him, French Canadians were slackers, and the 
Liberals were soft on winning the war, on 
conscription, and on Quebec. And, of course, 
working on the Conservative Party in World War 
II led necessarily to seeing just how Mackenzie 
King beat the Tories, kept Quebec behind him, 
and the conscription issue under control. King 
had learned from the Great War experience, and 
the Conservatives and Arthur Meighen had not. 
Now this was in the early 1960s just as the 
Quiet Revolution was getting underway. I had 
some understanding of Quebec, I thought, 
because I had gone to College Militaire Royal de 
St-Jean and lived in the province for three years. 
I was even - briefly - bilingual. I was predisposed 
to be sympathetic to the modernization of 
Quebec then underway, and the work I had done 
on the Conservative Party during the war showed 
me how necessary it was for a Canadian party 
to understand Quebec and to come to terms with 
its reality. 
Then from 1963 to 1966 I was in the United 
States at graduate school at Duke University. My 
PhD thesis topic was an expansion of the work I 
had done for Saywell - eventually published in 
1967 as The Politics of Survival: The 
Conservative party 1939-1945. I was hired at 
York in 1966, the same year I left the Army where 
I had worked at the Directorate of History at 
National Defence Headquarters. As the author 
of a book on the Conservatives - there were few 
others - I found myself participating in the party 
When I graduated from the Royal Military College in 1961, I wanted 
to do American history in graduate 
school and to write about Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and the New Deal. But I was 
advised by my RMC professors that US 
history was too crowded a field and that 
Roosevelt had been overdone (amazing 
that they could have said that in 1961!). 
"There was more room in Canadian history," they 
said. So, ever obedient, I went off to the 
University of Toronto on leave without pay from 
the Army to do an MA and was fortunate enough 
to find myself in John Saywell's superb class in 
Canadian political history. I didn't have a topic 
in mind and asked Saywell to suggest something. 
"How about the Communist Party in World War 
II?", he said, adding that no one had yet done 
that. I duly began to read into the subject and 
went to Party headquarters on Cecil Street in 
Toronto and asked if I could read their files. After 
some hesitation, the party officials agreed, and 
I began. It suddenly hit me that I was a young 
officer in the Canadian Army and it might not 
help my career to be spending afternoons on 
Cecil Street. So I telephoned the Intelligence 
officer at Central Command Headquarters in 
Oakville and asked him what to do. "Call 
Sergeant X at RCMP headquarters," he said, so 
I did. The Sergeant was not happy with me but 
promised to get back, and he soon did. I had 
been checked out and was OK; so had Saywell, 
and he wasn't a pinko, like so many professors 
at Toronto. And I could write on the Party 
providing that each time I came out of the Party 
headquarters, I was de-briefed. 
This seemed a bit burdensome when all I 
wanted to do was to secure my MA, so I went to 
see Saywell, apologized for being the cause of 
his being investigated, and asked him to suggest 
a new subject. "How about the Conservative Party 
in the Second World War?", he shot back. "No 
one has done that either." So there I was, saved 
from being trapped in the sectarian ghetto of 
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Angus L. Macdonald and others. All the Liberals 
had been shaped by their Great War experience 
- Ralston had been a battalion commander in 
Flanders - and clearly all the attitudes of the 
Second World War had emerged from the Great 
War. History lived, history repeated. 
After that book on the King government, I 
decided to write a history of conscription with 
J.M. Hitsman (who regrettably died while the 
book was in process). Now it will not surprise 
you that as I turned to look in depth at the Great 
War for the first time, I was already convinced 
that conscription was a bad thing. Nothing that 
I turned up in my research convinced me 
otherwise. There was the country's colonial 
relationship with Great Britain - and no good 
reason why Quebec should buy into that; there 
was the generally poorer health and earlier 
marriage age of Quebec men; there were the 
recruiting bungles of Militia minister Sam 
Hughes; and there was what I saw as the straight-
out racism of English Canada. The election of 
1917 was to me the nadir - with the charges in 
the press that if Laurier won, he'd win leading 
the cockroaches of the kitchen of Canada to 
victory; the claims that the Kaiser would cheer 
if trie Liberals and anti-conscription forces won; 
and the charges from otherwise intelligent men 
that French Canadians were, because of their 
failure to enlist in the requisite numbers , 
innately cowards. I found this simply repellent, 
and what I wrote reflected my distaste. Indeed, I 
said in the preface of Broken Promises: A History 
of Conscription in Canada, published in 1976, 
that I fervently hoped that my children would 
never be conscripted for anyone's war. And I 
meant it. 
Now my position was unquestionably based 
on my research - and also on the era in which I 
was living. I didn't support Trudeau politically, 
but I agreed with the Official Languages Act, and 
I looked with some pleasure at the rise of 
Quebec's self-confidence. I shared the view that 
Quebec had real grievances in Confederation. 
Conscription, after all, was one, the attempt of 
English Canada to make everyone fight Toronto's 
view of what the wars should be. I had been on 
the editorial board of The Canadian Forum 
which took a benign view of the possibility of 
Quebec independence, and I had vehemently 
opposed the imposition of the War Measures Act 
in the October Crisis of 1970. The Vietnam War 
was over by the time I wrote Broken Promises, 
leadership convention of 1967, though I was 
never a party member. Nonetheless, I was against 
John Diefenbaker and against his idea of "One 
Canada" which I interpreted as a code word for 
putting Quebec in its place. And I supported the 
"deux nations" line that was espoused at the 
Tories' Montmorency policy convention and the 
Toronto leadership convention. I can remember 
trying to explain what this meant to skeptical 
Prairie delegates, and there is no doubt in my 
mind t h a t it was my u n d e r s t a n d i n g of 
conscription and the Second World War that 
shaped my attitudes. And when Robert Stanfield, 
a moderate, intelligent man, was selected as 
leader and Diefenbaker was dumped, I rejoiced. 
But Stanfield was not to become Prime 
Minister. The Liberals chose Pierre Trudeau in 
1968, and he swept to power. I was not a 
supporter - I was resolutely NDP in my politics 
even though I had participated in the Tory 
convention of 1967 - but I was infuriated by the 
way some older Canadians complained about 
Trudeau's failure to serve in the military during 
the war, exactly the way Tories had complained 
about Mackenzie King's lack of military service 
during the Great War (but never Meighen's 
similar decision to stay in politics at home). This 
was anti-Trudeau, anti-Quebec racism, I was 
convinced. And even though 1 had gone to RMC 
and served in the peacetime Army, I was against 
the Vietnam War, then tearing the US apart. I 
have no doubt at all that this reinforced my anti-
conscription attitudes. I had seen friends at 
Duke desperately seeking ways not to be drafted, 
and I had met many young US military officers 
there who were just as desperately eager for a 
chance to fight. I sided with those who did not 
want to go. 
My attitudes were reinforced by my research 
on the King government during World War II, 
the research that eventually became Canada's 
War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King 
Government, 1939-1945, published in 1974. 
This research simply confirmed King's political 
genius for me because of the skillful way he had 
balanced the interests of English and French 
Canada during the hard days of war. Keeping 
the country together was his aim, and wartime 
pressures posed the worst threat to unity. He 
had succeeded, fending off the Opposition but 
also the u n t h i n k i n g - as I saw them -
conscriptionists in his own party: Defence 
minister J. Layton Ralston and Navy minister 
36 
2
Canadian Military History, Vol. 10 [2001], Iss. 4, Art. 5
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol10/iss4/5
when Canada had 750,000 men in khaki. I was 
wrong. The 24,000 Great War conscripts were 
enough to sustain the Canadian Corps for at least 
6 months of heavy fighting; 16,000 home defence 
conscripts would have met First Canadian 
Army's reinforcement needs through the rest of 
the war. 
The reason why this mattered only became 
clear to me after reading Whitaker's book. The 
casualties fell on the infantry in disproportionate 
numbers. An infantry battalion of 950 men could 
lose one-third of its men in a day, and every loss 
of trained soldiers, of brave soldiers - it was the 
bravest who suffered the most casualties - left 
the sections and platoons and companies 
understrength. A section often could be reduced 
to five in a second; a platoon of 30 could be at 
15 in a day; a company of 120 could be reduced 
to 60. That understrength section, platoon, and 
company, that weakened battalion, had to cover 
the same ground and mount the same attacks. 
And with fewer men, the casualties increased. 
In other words, trained infantry reinforcements 
were essential to keep units up to strength and 
to minimize casualt ies . And as the army 
struggled in October 1944 to keep its units up 
to strength, it re-mustered men from other 
corps to the infantry. Whitaker was scathing 
as he explained that such men had forgotten 
or never knew much about infantry fighting -
they simply didn't know how to arm a grenade 
or fire a Br en gun. They were a danger to the 
experienced infantry, and they were quick to 
but its effects were still being felt. There is no 
doubt that these things shaped my approach. 
Yes, I believe that the evidence also supported 
the view I took, but the times, I now think, were 
just as important. 
What began to change my mind? The times, 
for one. I might be a bit slow, but I suddenly 
came to realize in 1980 that Rene Levesque, a 
man I thought the most attractive politician in 
Canada, wanted to split the nation. I still 
remember going on a trip to do research at 
Bishop's University in Lennoxville, Quebec in the 
Spring of 1980 during the Referendum campaign 
and suddenly realizing that those bastards 
wanted to tear apart my country. The times they 
were a-changing for me - and for Canadians. 
But what definitively swung me around was 
the publication of Tug of War: The Canadian 
Victory that Opened Antwerp, by Denis and 
Shelagh Whitaker in 1984. Whitaker had been a 
brave and much decorated officer in the Royal 
Hamilton Light Infantry in World War II, and his 
book on the Scheldt campaign of the fall of 1944 
opened my eyes. As an infantry officer, Whitaker 
understood, as I had not, that men serving in 
understrength units were in serious danger. I 
had jeered at the 24,132 conscripts who had 
arrived in France by the Armistice in November 
1918 as meaning nothing when we had enlisted 
625,000 volunteers in all. I had dismissed the 
16,000 NRMA men sent overseas as result of 
the conscription crisis of 1944 as meaningless 
An anti-conscription rally in Quebec. 
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Canadian Military Headquarters in Britain who 
many deem responsible for the conscription 
crisis of 1944. Pope saw that conscription could 
split the country, and he overcame his worries 
for his sons to argue strongly against it in 
November 1944. Stuar t innately favoured 
conscription but had said it would not be 
necessary; then when casualties mounted and 
reinforcements dried up, he changed his mind 
and argued its necessity. Both men tried to act 
in good conscience; both put their definition of 
country and nation first; and both were correct. 
If I had fallen prey to the temptation to let 
contemporary events shape my history in the 
past, in The Generals, I think, I overcame it. 
But the lesson you should draw from this is 
that the present shapes our understanding of 
the past. I am resolutely anti-ideological, and I 
dismiss Marxism and Marxist approaches to 
history as nothing but Groucho Marxism. I 
believe now as I have always done that the sole 
task of a historian is to try to understand what 
happened and why. But I know now that my 
politics, shifting and changing as I applied my 
analyses to events as I lived them, shaped what 
I wrote as a historian. I am not sure if I could 
have avoided this or even if this should be 
avoided. I only know what I did not in 1967, 
1974, and 1976 - that events in which I was a 
participant or observer determined to some 
substantial extent what I wrote. I doubt we can 
protect against this; we can, however, be aware 
of it, and that at least should play a part in how 
we read what historians have written. 
The former director of the Canadian War 
Museum, J.L. G r a n a t s t e i n h a s j u s t 
completed a history of the Canadian Army 
to be published by University of Toronto 
Press in 2002 
become casualties. (Trained men, General 
Chris Vokes once said, had a 75 percent chance 
of survival; untrained had none.) This was 
especially hard on French Canadian units, 
which had to scrape even harder for men 
because of relatively lower enlistments - and 
had to take on English-speaking officers 
because there were so few French-speaking. 
The Whitaker book changed my mind about 
conscription and removed the blinkers from my 
eyes. I was a (peacetime) soldier, but I had simply 
not factored in the risks to the men in the field. 
I had not made the connection between 
conscription and the front, between a hundred 
trained reinforcements and the success of a 
battalion in operations. It is also true that I was 
predisposed to have my mind changed. The 
Vietnam War was long over, and I had become 
interested again in current defence policy and 
appalled by the state of the Canadian Forces. I 
was remembering my RMC and army roots. 
Moreover, I was unhappy with the Quebec 
bargaining position on the constitution and 
increasingly unsympathetic - indeed, straight out 
opposed - to Quebec independentist ideas and 
arguments which I viewed as based on lies and 
misrepresentations. In other words, the new 
information - new to me - in Whitaker fed into 
my growing dislike for Quebec's aspirations. And 
that led me to re-appraise my position on 
conscription. 
Now was this bad? I think not. It is a good 
thing for historians to constantly re-assess their 
interpretations, and I make no apology for that. 
But I do wish I had been as aware as I am now 
of the extent to which contemporary politics had 
shaped my attitudes and approaches. 
I think my awareness of this is most evident 
in The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior 
Commanders in the Second World War which I 
published in 1993. This is, I think, just about 
the best thing I have written, and certainly it was 
the easiest - the book just about wrote itself. In 
it, I came to terms with the impact RMC had on 
my personality and life, and I wrote my most 
balanced interpretation of conscription. In one 
chapter, I looked at two generals who had served 
with distinction in the Great War - Maurice Pope 
and Ken Stuart. Pope was half-French Canadian 
and the military adviser to Mackenzie King, with 
two sons overseas; Stuart was the former Chief 
of the General Staff and senior officer at 
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